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Credit Cards
Summary
Credit card minimum payments can act as an “anchor” that causes consumers to pay less of their debt than
they otherwise would, leading to higher balances and interest costs, lower credit card scores, increased
bankruptcy risks, and in the aggregate, suboptimally high levels of debt in the macro-economy. Policy
“nudges,” which aim to increase the monthly amount that individuals pay on their credit card debt, have had
mixed results.
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Smart choice architectures have been shown 
to yield remarkable improvements in retire-
ment savings, organ donation, and health 
and environmental decisions. But nudges 
don’t always work, and sometimes well-
intended policies can have perverse effects. 
Our recent research uncovers evidence of 
perverse nudges in the context of consumer 
credit cards.1 
With about $700 billion in total 
outstanding balances and 400 million 
open accounts, credit cards are the fourth 
largest source of household borrowing in 
the United States after mortgages, student 
loans, and auto loans.2 In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, the industry underwent 
the most expansive regulatory change in its 
history with the Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 
(“CARD Act”). And in 2011, the industry 
received a new regulator with the creation of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) following the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Financial Protection Act 
of 2010. But despite the prevalence of credit 
card debt and recent regulatory attention, 
there is surprisingly little systematic evi-
dence about how consumers choose to pay 
down their credit card debt and what factors 
promote versus hinder debt reduction.
Minimum payments are present on all 
monthly credit card statements, and repre-
sent the minimum amount a consumer must 
pay in order to stay current on her account 
and avoid late fees and other penalties. The 
median minimum payment is 3 percent of a 
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In their 2008 book Nudge, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein lay 
out a framework for “libertarian paternalism,” a policy approach 
that seeks to improve consumers’ decisions without restricting 
their freedom to choose. 
 
brief in brief
•	 Credit	card	minimum	payments	can	act	
as	an	“anchor”	that	causes	consumers	to	
pay	less	of	their	debt	than	they	otherwise	
would,	 leading	 to	higher	balances	and	
interest	costs,	lower	credit	card	scores,	
increased	bankruptcy	 risks,	and	 in	 the	
aggregate,	suboptimally	high	 levels	of	
debt	in	the	macro-economy.
•		Policy	“nudges,”	which	aim	to	increase	
the	monthly	amount	that	individuals	pay	
on	their	credit	card	debt,	have	had	mixed	
results.
•		While	raising	required	minimum	payment	
levels	encouraged	consumers	with	low	
credit	card	balances	to	pay	a	larger	frac-
tion	of	their	debt,	 it	also	nudged	some	
high-balance	borrowers	to	pay	less	than	
they	previously	did.
•		Similarly,	new	disclosure	 requirements,	
including	late	payment	and	minimum	pay-
ment	warnings,	 in	some	cases	caused	
borrowers	who	had	been	paying	 their	
monthly	balances	in	full,	to	pay	less.
•		While	policy	nudges	can	work,	policymak-
ers	must	take	into	account	their	potentially	
disparate	impacts	in	order	to	achieve	the	
results	they	are	seeking.
consumer’s total balance. Despite a median 
APR of 17 percent, one third of credit card 
accounts are regularly paid with just the 
minimum amount, and minimum payers 
carry typical balances of nearly $3000. Over 
five years, a minimum payer with a typical 
balance and purchases would see her balance 
more than triple and pay over $2300 in 
interest charges.3
Previous research suggests that con-
sumer impatience may contribute to high 
levels of credit card borrowing,4 and that 
high levels of household leverage are associ-
ated with the more severe impacts of the 
Great Recession.5 Experimental research 
also suggests that minimum payments may 
act as an “anchor” that causes consumers to 
pay less of their debt than they otherwise 
would in the absence of the suggested pay-
ment amount. If anchoring is an important 
factor in practice, it could cause individual 
consumers to carry too much debt and 
pay too much in interest costs given their 
economic circumstances, leading to lower 
credit scores and increased bankruptcy risk.6 
In the aggregate, anchoring could also cause 
the level of debt in the macro-economy to 
be suboptimally high.
Amid growing concern about America’s 
national credit card bill, which peaked at 
nearly $900 billion in 2008, policy changes 
implemented by the CARD Act and by 
individual issuers have sought to increase 
consumer payments. But are they effective? 
What factors contribute to why so many 
consumers pay only the minimum payment, 
and what can be done to help consumers 
reduce their debt burdens? In this issue 
brief, we describe the details of our research 
on the patterns of consumer credit card pay-
ments and the impacts of policy changes on 
payment behavior.
the behavioral 
eCoNoMiCs of aNChoriNg
In their landmark study, Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman proposed that “anchor-
ing” can cause an individual’s decisions to be 
significantly influenced by irrelevant starting 
values.7 In their original experiment and 
subsequent studies, subjects latch onto an 
initial uninformative value (such as the last 
four digits of their phone number or social 
security number) as a decision-making 
heuristic. As a result, experimenters find 
that subjects’ responses to general knowl-
edge questions such as the percentage of 
African countries in the United Nations are 
significantly biased in the direction of that 
initial, irrelevant starting value.
In the context of credit cards, the 
minimum payment may be a particularly 
potent anchor because failing to pay at 
least that amount may trigger a late fee and 
penalty interest rate. Thus, a borrower may 
perceive being in good standing with the 
lender—and on track for future financial 
well-being—as long as she pays at least that 
amount. Along with the full balance, the 
minimum payment is the most prominent 
payment option shown on monthly state-
ments. The contrast between the full bal-
ance, which is typically thousands of dollars, 
and the minimum, which is often as low as 
$15 or $20, can make the minimum seem 
like an attractive option for cash-strapped 
consumers. All of these factors could make 
the minimum payment an especially salient 
and influential anchor for consumer choices.
how do CoNsuMers rePay 
Credit Card debt?
Using a new dataset from the CFPB cover-
ing a large share of credit card accounts in 
the United States, we find evidence that 
minimum payments play a significant role 
in consumer debt payments.8 To understand 
consumer payment behavior, we classified 
accounts based on whether the account 
holders consistently paid in full or paid the 
minimum at least 50 percent of the time. 
As shown in Figure 1, consumers exhibit 
consistent patterns when paying down a 
given credit card account. About one third 
of account holders are “full payers,” and they 
pay their balances in full 90 percent of the 
time.9 For full payers, credit cards are used 
more as a convenience vehicle than a credit 
product.10 Another third are “minimum 
payers,” and pay close to the minimum 77 
percent of the time. One third of these 
minimum payers pay exactly the minimum 
payment, and the remainder pays within 
$50 of the minimum.11 The final group of 
“mixed payers” variably pays a combina-
tion of minimum, full, and intermediate 
 1  This	brief	draws	heavily	on	a	working	paper	by	Benjamin	
J.	Keys	and	Jialan	Wang:	“Perverse	Nudges:	Minimum	
Payments	and	Debt	Paydown”	(2014).
 2  Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	“Quarterly	Report	on	
Household	Debt	and	Credit,”	February	2014.
 3  Author’s	calculations	based	on	the	sample	from	Keys	and	
Wang	(2014).
 4  David	Laibson,	Andrea	Repetto,	and	Jeremy	Tobacman,	
“A	Debt	Puzzle,”	NBER	Working	Paper	No.	7879	(2010).
 5  Atif	Mian	and	Amir	Sufi,	 “Household	Leverage	and	the	
Recession	of	2007–09,”	 IMF	Economic	Review	58.1	
(2010):	74-117.
 6  Daniel	Navarro-Martinez,	et	al,	“Minimum	Required	Pay-
ment	and	Supplemental	 Information	Disclosure	Effects	
on	Consumer	Debt	Repayment	Decisions,”	Journal	of	
Marketing	Research	48.SPL	(2011):	S60-S77.	Neil	Stew-
art,	 “The	Cost	of	Anchoring	on	Credit-Card	Minimum	
Repayments,”	Psychological	Science	20.1	(2009):	39-41.
 7  Amos	Tversky	and	Daniel	Kahneman,	“Judgment	Under	
Uncertainty:	Heuristics	and	Biases,”	Science	185.4157	
(1974):	1124-1131.
 8  Our	data	come	 from	 the	CFPB	credit	card	database	
(CCDB),	which	contains	credit	card	accounts	from	large	
U.S.	credit	card	issuers,	covering	a	large	fraction	of	total	
outstanding	balances	 in	 the	market	between	2008	and	
2012.	The	statistics	presented	 in	 this	brief	are	derived	
from	a	subsample	of	 issuers.	The	CCDB	 is	confidential	
supervisory	 information,	and	the	statistics	presented	 in	
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figure 1:  CoMPositioN of Credit Card aCCouNts by Payer tyPe
amounts, and constitutes 35 percent of 
credit card accounts.
Despite the mix of payment patterns, 
the vast majority of payments consist of 
either the full balance or an amount close 
to the minimum. As shown in Figure 2, all 
three groups display strongly bimodal pay-
ment patterns. Even mixed payers typically 
pay close to the minimum, which is gener-
ally less than 10 percent of the balance. 
Strikingly, fewer than 10 percent of all pay-
ments fall between 20 and 99 percent of the 
balance. Even high-income borrowers do 
not always pay off their credit card balances 
in full, choosing instead to revolve debt at 
substantial annual interest rates.12 
Low repayments contribute to con-
sumers carrying significant levels of debt 
compared to their income. The median 
ratio of total balance to monthly income 
is 64 percent for minimum payers and 42 
percent for mixed payers.13 Since minimum 
payments and monthly interest charges are 
only a small fraction of the total balance, 
most households can afford the costs of 
debt servicing. But as the calculation above 
shows, paying only the minimum while 
continuing to finance purchases leads to 
growing debt balances that can become 
difficult to repay in the long run. The one 
percent of U.S. households that file for 
bankruptcy each year typically have tens of 
thousands in credit card debt accumulated 
through a combination of high purchases 
and low payments.
Standard economic models would sug-
gest that borrowers who accumulate large 
debt balances would choose to gradually 
pay down their debt over time as a share of 
their income, rather than paying only the 
minimum for a period of time and then 
paying off the entire balance as a lump 
sum.14 The bimodal pattern is consistent 
with borrowers anchoring on the minimum 
payment when faced with a large credit card 
bill, so that consumers who would other-
wise have paid an intermediate proportion, 
such as 30 percent or 50 percent of their 
balance, instead choose lower amounts close 
to the minimum.15 
what haPPeNs wheN 
issuers raise the 
required MiNiMuM 
PayMeNt?
The first set of policies we examine is a 
series of changes in issuers’ minimum 
payment formulas. In the time period we 
examine between 2008 and 2012, all of 
the changes in issuer formulas resulted 
in increases in the required minimums. 
For affected issuers, minimum payments 
increased by an average of $18, or about 5 
percent of the balance, for account months 
with positive balances.
We find that raising the required 
minimum payments had no net impact on 
overall consumer payments, resulting from 
a combination of two offsetting effects. 
The policy changes had very different 
impacts for borrowers with different balance 
amounts. As shown in Figure 3, raising the 
minimum payment increased the average 
fraction of the balance paid by 1 percent for 
accounts with less than $1000 outstand-
ing. The leftmost set of columns shows this 
average effect. As shown in the remaining 
columns, this effect is mechanically driven 
by minimum payers who move to the new, 
higher minimum amounts to avoid late fees. 
More surprisingly, we find that consum-
ers with balances over $3000 reduced the 
average fraction of the balance they paid 
by roughly 2 percent. For this latter group, 
the change in the minimum represented 
a negligible fraction of their balances, and 
they reacted in the opposite direction of the 
policy change. Furthermore, the response 
of these high-balance accounts is entirely 
driven by borrowers shifting from paying 
off their cards in full to paying only the 
minimum.16 Our results suggest that the 
new, higher minimum payments anchored 
low-balance consumers at a slightly higher 
default payment amount, but in the process 
nudged some high-balance borrowers in the 
wrong direction toward lower payments.
did the Card aCt helP 
CoNsuMers Pay dowN 
debt?
In addition to looking at changes in credit 
card issuers’ minimum payment formulas, 
our research examines changes initiated 
this	brief	are	aggregated	to	maintain	the	confidentiality	of	
the	underlying	data.
 9  These	consumers	are	often	termed	“transactors”	 in	 the	
credit	card	industry.	Minimum	payers	and	mixed	payers	
are	often	jointly	termed	“revolvers”	in	industry	parlance.
 10  Consumers	who	routinely	pay	their	balances	in	full	often	
receive	the	benefits	of	convenience	with	no	annual	 fee,	
and	often	also	receive	rewards	and	other	benefits.	Thus,	
credit	card	 issuers	often	make	negative	profits	on	 full	
payers.	See	Sumit	Agarwal,	et	al.,	“Regulating	Consumer	
Financial	Products:	Evidence	from	Credit	Cards,”	NBER	
Working	Paper.	No.19484	(2013).
 11  Rounding	behavior	 is	very	prevalent	 in	credit	card	pay-
ments.	Borrowers	often	pay	 in	$50,	$100,	$1000,	and	
other	 round	 increments,	suggesting	 that	 they	may	use	
rounding	heuristics	as	a	budgeting	mechanism	or	a	
way	to	increase	their	debt	payments	above	the	required	
minimum.
 12  Forty	percent	of	payments	made	by	borrowers	reporting	
more	 than	$200,000	per	year	 in	 income	are	 less	 than	
10	percent	of	 the	balance.	Our	measure	of	 income	 is	
individual	annual	income	reported	by	the	borrower	at	the	
time	of	their	credit	card	application.
 13  In	our	current	analysis,	we	are	only	able	 to	observe	
individual	accounts,	and	cannot	 link	multiple	accounts	
issued	to	 the	same	consumer.	Since	most	consumers	
with	at	least	one	credit	card	have	multiple	accounts,	debt	
levels	at	the	individual	level	are	likely	to	be	at	least	double	
figure 2:  distributioN of PayMeNts as fraCtioN of balaNCe
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by the CARD Act of 2009. The CARD 
Act included a broad range of provisions 
designed to make credit card pricing fairer 
and more transparent to consumers, includ-
ing limitations on interest rate changes, fee 
restrictions for late payments and overlimit 
transactions, and changes in billing and 
payment allocation practices. One study 
shows that these provisions have saved U.S. 
consumers $12.6 billion per year, and the 
2013 CARD Act Report also estimates a 
decline in the total cost of credit charged to 
consumers.17 
In addition to directly changing the way 
credit card fees are assessed, the CARD Act 
also mandated four distinct new disclosure 
requirements to help consumers better 
understand the impacts of their payment 
choices on the costs of borrowing. The 
CARD Act disclosures comprise the second 
set of policies we look at in our study of 
credit card payments. 
The four disclosures took effect in 
February of 2010. A late payment warn-
ing was required on all statements, such 
as: “Late Payment Warning: If we do not 
receive your minimum payment by the date 
listed above, you may have to pay a $35 late 
fee and your APRs may be increased up to 
the Penalty APR of 28.99 percent.” Most 
statements were also required to include a 
general minimum payment warning, stat-
ing: “Minimum Payment Warning: If you 
make more than the minimum payment 
each period, you will pay less in interest and 
pay off your balance sooner.” Instead of this 
standard minimum payment warning, con-
sumers whose stated minimum payments 
did not amortize their balance received a 
more drastic warning: “Minimum Pay-
ment Warning: Even if you make no more 
charges using this card, if you make only the 
minimum payment each month we estimate 
you will never pay off the balance shown on 
this statement because your payment will be 
less than the interest charged each month.” 
Finally, the majority of statements also were 
required to include a comparison between 
the payment duration and interest costs of 
paying only the minimum versus paying 
an amount that would amortize the loan 
amount, without additional purchases, in 
three years. An example of this disclosure is 
shown in Figure 4. 
Since different combinations of 
disclosures were shown to different sets of 
consumers based on specific eligibility rules, 
we were able to disentangle their individual 
effects. In contrast to the minimum formula 
changes discussed above, the disclosures did 
not change the economic incentives around 
credit card payments. Instead, the new 
disclosures simply presented information 
that was already present in or could be cal-
culated from credit card contracts, monthly 
statements, and pre-existing disclosures 
mandated by the Federal Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA). Thus, their impacts represent 
a distinct test of the potential anchoring 
effects of minimum payments and of con-
sumer understanding.
We find that overall, the disclosures 
increased payments by $19 per account-
month, resulting from consumers chang-
ing their payment behavior in at least 2-4 
percent of accounts per month. The results 
confirm that purely informational nudges 
have impacts on consumer choices.18 The 
those	that	we	report.
 14  However,	 the	bimodal	pattern	we	observe	could	 result	
from	consumers	paying	down	multiple	cards	at	a	 time	
with	different	interest	rates,	and	we	will	explore	this	pos-
sibility	in	future	work.	The	bimodal	pattern	could	also	be	
rationalized	 if	consumers	pay	the	minimum	because	of	
0%	APR	promotional	offers.	However,	we	find	that	 the	
same	pattern	 remains	even	after	excluding	 those	with	
promotional	offers.
 15  We	also	find	that	 the	most	significant	correlate	of	pay-
ment	behavior	 is	a	consumer’s	credit	 score,	which	a	
measure	of	past	payment	behavior.	 	While	economic	
fundamentals	 such	as	 income	and	 interest	 rate	 are	
not	 strongly	 correlated	with	 payment	 behavior,	 the	
importance	of	credit	score	and	consistency	of	payment	
patterns	for	a	given	consumer	over	time	provides	further	
evidence	 that	behavioral	 factors	may	drive	payment	
choices.	
 16  The	 results	described	 in	 this	paragraph	are	based	on	
regression	analysis	 that	controls	 for	characteristics	of	
cards,	issuers,	consumers,	and	account	usage	to	isolate	
the	impacts	of	the	minimum	payment	changes.	See	Keys	
and	Wang	(2014)	for	more	details.
 17  Agarwal,	et	al.	(2014).
 18  According	 to	 the	CARD	Act	Study	 (2014),	between	
25-38	percent	of	consumers	make	credit	card	payment	
online.	The	majority	of	 these	consumers	do	not	access	
their	electronic	statements	before	making	payments,	and	
Source: Federal Reserve Board: http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntk_creditcardrules.htm.
figure 3:  the effeCt of issuer iNCreases iN the MiNiMuM PayMeNt
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figure 4:  exaMPle of three-year CalCulatioN disClosure MaNdated by the Card aCt
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therefore	do	not	see	the	disclosures.	Thus,	our	 results	
under-estimate	the	impact	of	disclosures	if	all	consumers	
saw	the	disclosures	before	choosing	their	payments.
 19  Uri	Gneezy	and	Aldo	Rustichini,	“A	Fine	Is	a	Price,”	Jour-
nal	of	Legal	Studies	29	(2000):	1.
 20  Brigitte	C.	Madrian,	and	Dennis	F.	Shea,	“The	Power	of	
Suggestion:	 Inertia	 in	401	 (k)	Participation	and	Savings	
Behavior.”	Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics	116.4	(2001):	
1149-1187.
 21  Jeffrey	R.	Brown,	Arie	Kapteyn,	and	Olivia	S.	Mitchell,	
“Framing	Effects	and	Expected	Social	Security	Claiming	
Behavior,”	NBER	Working	Paper	No.	17018	(2011).
 22  Dora	L	Costa	and	Matthew	E.	Kahn,	“Energy	Conserva-
tion	“Nudges”	and	Environmentalist	 Ideology:	Evidence	
from	a	Randomized	Residential	Electricity	Field	Experi-
ment,”	Journal	of	 the	European	Economic	Association	
11.3	(2013):	680-702.
 23  Julie	S.	Downs,	George	Loewenstein,	and	Jessica	Wis-
dom,	“Strategies	for	Promoting	Healthier	Food	Choices,”	
American	Economic	Review	(2009):	159-164.
three different combinations of disclosures 
that consumers received had very different 
impacts. Accounts receiving the non-
amortization warning and 3-year calculation 
saw payments increase by $24 per month, 
and had a small but insignificant increase in 
the average fraction paid. In contrast, those 
receiving the minimum payment warning 
and 3-year payment calculation increased 
payments by only $4 per month. 
In the absence of a strongly-worded 
warning against non-amortizing payments, 
the 3-year payment calculation amount 
appeared to cause borrowers who were 
paying in full to pay less, possibly as a result 
of a new anchoring effect. In addition, the 
3-year calculation slightly raised the pay-
ments of those who were previously paying 
low amounts and moved them towards the 
higher anchor. Because the perverse nudge 
effect dominates, accounts receiving the 
3-year calculation and standard minimum 
payment warning saw a 0.6 percent overall 
reduction in the fraction of balances paid 
and a 1.4 percent decline in the account-
months paid in full.
PoliCy iMPliCatioNs
Our work is part of a growing body of 
research documenting the mixed conse-
quences of nudges in a diverse set of policy 
domains. In a well-known example, late 
pickups by parents actually increased at an 
Israeli preschool after fines were imposed.19 
Automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans is one 
of the most successful examples of nudges at 
work. Nonetheless, while automatic enroll-
ment helps most consumers save more, it 
may decrease savings among some consum-
ers who would have enrolled on their own.20 
Research has also found that “break-even” 
framing may lead to early claiming of 
Social Security benefits,21 that peer-based 
nudges decrease energy consumption among 
liberal households, but increase consump-
tion among conservatives,22 and that calorie 
information may cause dieters to eat more.23
Similarly, we find that introducing 
higher suggested payment amounts leads 
to two countervailing effects on consumer 
credit card payments. Issuers that raised 
the required minimum payment saw small 
increases in payment amounts among 
low-balance accounts paying the minimum. 
But the changes also nudged high-balance 
consumers in the wrong direction, decreas-
ing the fraction of accounts paid in full. 
A disclosure mandated by the CARD Act 
resulted in similar offsetting effects for 
different groups of accounts. Although the 
CARD Act had positive overall impacts on 
consumers, the payment amount suggested 
on the three-year payment amount disclo-
sure may have been too low to effectively 
increase consumer payments.
Our results suggest that in order to 
be effective, future credit card nudges 
should encourage payment amounts high 
enough such that any offsetting effects lead 
to greater payments overall. Our current 
research shows that suggested payment 
amounts should be greater than the $20 
average minimum payment increases and 
the 3-year suggested payment amounts in 
the policies we studied. Furthermore, since 
increasing required minimums forces some 
consumers to become delinquent and suf-
fer late fees and potential default, making 
the suggested payment amount an option 
rather than a requirement can help preserve 
flexibility while encouraging repayment. 
In future work, we hope to evaluate the 
impact of higher repayment options through 
randomized control trials. While our current 
work only explores the impacts of low sug-
gested payment amounts that we find to be 
ineffective, the results of these future trials 
could yield evidence of successful payment 
disclosures.
Our results also offer broader lessons 
for policymakers. One lesson is that purely 
informational nudges do work, consistent 
with prior research. Of equal importance, 
our results emphasize that changes in choice 
architecture affect not only the intended 
recipients of a nudge, but everyone who is 
subject to the change. A beneficial choice 
for one consumer may be detrimental for 
another, depending on what their choices 
would have been in the absence of the 
nudge. These disparate impacts should be 
taken into account when weighing the over-
all welfare implications of any policy change.
The views expressed are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, its 
director, or its staff.
“Amid growing concern about 
America’s national credit card 
bill, which peaked at nearly 
$900 billion in 2008, policy 
changes have sought to increase 
consumer payments. But are 
they effective?”
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